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Abstract 
Doctors may also be criminals. Mercifully, this is a rare event but no health professional is 
infallible, mistakes happen and the challenge is to distinguish inadvertence from wilful 
disregard for the consequences. Healthcare professionals are uneasy about the readiness of the 
current law to attribute criminal responsibility accompanied by a failure to recognise the highly 
pressurised context in which substandard practice occurs. This article argues that the offence 
of gross negligence manslaughter is improperly defined and fails to target those doctors whom 
society should criminalise. Alternatives to gross negligence manslaughter to include culpable 
homicide adopted in Scotland and the major departure test favoured by New Zealand are 
considered before advocating a more radical approach - the sliding scale of negligence. Using 
existing tests in civil and administrative law a more objective test of gross negligence is 
proposed, with culpability as a mandatory requirement for a doctor to be convicted of a crime. 
It is contended the law must move away from the stance a patient’s death is required for medical 
negligence to become a crime, an outcome bias, to a conduct biased offence.  There is no 
principled reason why culpable gross negligence causing serious harm should not also be 
subject to criminal sanction. The recent sentencing guidelines demonstrate the law is 
sophisticated enough to distinguish reprehensible conduct from careless behaviour. It is now 
time for the legal test to also acknowledge all the circumstances of the alleged crime. 
  
 
  
2 
 
Introduction – Gross negligence manslaughter and Doctors 
The criminal doctor makes for a good story.1 The fall and resurgence of Drs David Sellu and 
Hadiza Bawa-Garba has been as dramatic as it has been controversial.2 Two previously 
anonymous medical professionals who found themselves not only under the media spotlight 
and labelled a criminal, but in the case of David Sellu incarcerated in a Bellmarsh cell. Their 
very personal stories have reignited the debate whether doctors should be subject to the 
criminal law and more particularly whether doctors should, and if so how, be prosecuted for 
gross negligence manslaughter. In a speech given to the Medico-Legal Society Dr Michael 
Powers QC, responding to concerns that prosecutions take place ‘at the least excuse,’ strongly 
advocated the role of the criminal law, commenting: 
‘We have got to have an element of control over excessively bad behaviour … society 
has the right to control bad professional care.’ adding, ‘whether or not a doctor is going 
to find himself on a manslaughter charge will really depend on how much thought, how 
much care and how much attention he is giving to what he does……..The cases where 
we have seen convictions are cases which stick out like a barn door.’3 
 
Some writers argue recent convictions have occurred where the barn door was ajar rather than 
gaping open.4  If Dr Powers’ contention is correct, and bad clinical care should be prosecuted, 
it is necessary to address what conduct should be caught by the criminal law, as opposed to  
sub-standard conduct that should be left to the civil courts or professional tribunals. More 
specifically, the law must define the standard of culpability deserving of criminal sanction. 
 
The grounds of doctors’ concerns are broadly that the law of gross negligence manslaughter is 
arbitrary, and even the very limited prosecutions are counter-productive if doctors remain 
unsure as to what it is they are doing so badly wrong that they may end up in prison. Doctors’ 
grievances can perhaps be broken down into two elements: 
 
 
* Michelle Robson is Senior Lecturer in Law and member of the Medical and Mental Health Law Research Interest Group 
(MELRIG), School of Law, University of Northumbria. Dr Jon Maskill is a consultant anaesthetist and intensivist at Doncaster 
Royal Infirmary and member of MELRIG. Professor Warren Brookbanks is Professor of Criminal Law and Justice Studies at 
Auckland University of Technology (AUT) Auckland. 
 
1 Margaret Brazier, Sarah Devaney, Danielle Griffiths, Alexandra Mullock, & Hannah Quirk ‘Improving healthcare through 
the use of medical manslaughter? Facts, fears and the future’ Clinical Risk 2016, Vol 22 (5-6) 88-93, 89 
2 R v Bawa-Garba [2016] EWCA Crim 1841; R v Sellu [2016] EWCA Crim 1716 
3 Dr M Powers QC ‘Manslaughter – How Did We Get Here? ‘ Medico-Legal Journal (2005) Vol 73 Part 4, 128 
4 See Amel Alghrani; Margaret Brazier, Anne-Marie Farrell, Danielle Griffiths & Neil Allen ‘Healthcare Scandals in the 
NHS: Crime and Punishment’ Journal Med Ethics 2011: 37, 230-232; Jenny Vaughan, Oliver Quick, Danielle Griffiths, 
‘RCS bulletin: Medical Manslaughter: where next’ RCS Bulletin Vol 100 Issue 6: Sept 2018 pp 251-254 
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First, the current offence does not identify the “bad” doctors; it unearths negligent doctors 
whose patients are unlucky enough to die. The scope of the offence is uncertain. 
 
Second, professionals acting in good faith should not be labelled ‘criminals.’ The element of 
intentionally making a bad choice, the pre-requisite mens rea of all serious crimes, is often 
unclear or even absent. This culpability ingredient of the offence is poorly defined.  
  
Beginning with an overview of the offence of gross negligence manslaughter and a critique of 
the current,  this article addresses what form an alternative test might take.  Brief consideration 
is given to the law in other jurisdictions; the Scottish offence of culpable homicide and New 
Zealand’s major departure test, before exploring further the circumstances for negligent 
conduct to be considered culpable and the foundations for a new approach. Pivotal to this 
discussion is the distinction between an error and a violation and, it is maintained, the 
criminalisation of negligent conduct should only occur when the defendant is aware of a risk, 
elects to run that risk and had the opportunity to act differently. The debate then takes a more 
radical turn and proposes a new test, the sliding scale of negligence. By bringing civil and 
criminal law principles together, the bar between simple negligence and gross negligence is 
drawn with greater clarity, leaving the question of culpability to be determined separately along 
the lines recently espoused by the Sentencing Council. Sentencing guidelines, and the potential 
widening of the offence to include culpable conduct causing serious harm, not just death are 
finally considered. 5 
 
In conclusion, this article contends that the current offence is inadequate and an alternative test 
that targets only the most serious of violations is required.6 More controversially, to counteract 
the injustice caused by ‘moral luck’, the scope of the offence should be widened to include 
culpable conduct causing serious harm, not just death.7  
 
 
 
 
 
5 See later discussion;’ Moral luck’and Sentencing – the final bastion. 
6 See later and more generally Alan Merry and Warren Brookbanks ‘Merry and McCall Smith’s Errors, Medicine and the 
Law’ Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed Ch 4 p 41 et seq. 
7 See later discussion of  ‘Moral luck’- should the outcome matter more than the violation? 
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The offence of gross negligence manslaughter 
Gross negligence manslaughter, particularly amongst the medical profession, has been the 
subject of much criticism.8 The current offence survived the Law Commission review of 2006, 
which maintained that the defendant’s conduct should be compared with that of the 
hypothetical ‘reasonable person’9 and has only been subject to minor modifications since the 
modern offence took shape in 1995.10 Before considering the ingredients of the offence and 
those elements which generate disquiet amongst doctors it is necessary to set out a brief 
exposition of the history and development of the offence to its present configuration. 
 
Tort to crime: negligence to gross negligence 
Occasionally, professionals cause fatal harm to people to whom they owe a duty of care by 
falling so far below a standard that the matter becomes one of interest to the state. Lord Hewart 
addressed this almost 100 years ago in R v Bateman.11 
Dr Bateman attempted the delivery of a breech baby with forceps and then, having failed, tried 
to turn the baby manually to effect a more favourable presentation. Ultimately, the child was 
stillborn and the mother left with a number of internal injuries from which she died.12 The judge 
in the court of first instance directed the jury to find Dr Bateman guilty of gross negligence 
manslaughter if they found he had been negligent.13 The conviction was quashed by the Court 
of Appeal and, in giving his judgment, Lord Hewart made some notable points: 
 ‘In the civil action, if it is proved that A fell short of the standard of reasonable 
 care required by law, it matters not how far he fell short of that standard. The 
 extent of his liability depends not on the degree of negligence, but on the amount of 
 damage done. In the criminal court, on the contrary, the amount and degree of 
 negligence are the determining question. There must be mens rea.’14 
 
8 See Jonathan Montgomery ‘Medicalizing crime – criminalizing health?’ in Erin C & Ost S (eds) The criminal justice system 
and healthcare (Oxford 2007);  Oliver Quick ‘Prosecuting 'Gross' Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion, and the 
Crown Prosecution Service’ [2006] 33 Journal of Law and Society 421; Oliver Quick ‘Medicine, mistakes and manslaughter: 
A Criminal Combination?’ [2010] 69 The Cambridge Law Journal 186; Alexander McCall Smith ‘Criminal negligence and 
the incompetent doctor’ [1993] 1 Medical Law Review 336 ;Margaret Brazier and Neil Allen ‘Criminalising medical 
malpractice’ in Charles Erin & Suzanne Ost (eds) The criminal justice system and healthcare (Oxford 2007) pp 15-27 
9 The Law Commission (LAW COM No 304) MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE Project 6 of the Ninth 
Programme of Law Reform: Homicide. At 3.59 Gross negligence manslaughter can be committed even when D was unaware 
that his or her conduct might cause death, or even injury. This is because negligence, however gross, does not necessarily 
involve any actual realization that one is posing a risk of harm: it is a question of how glaringly obvious the riskwould have 
been to a reasonable person.  
10 See later R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; R v Misra and Srivasta [2004] EWCA Crim 2395; R v Rudling  [2016] EWCA 
Crim 741 
11 R v Bateman [1925] All ER Rep 45, 48 
12 Her uterus was severely damaged and delivered along with the placenta. 
13 Bateman, above n.11  
14 Ibid. at 47 
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If the Crown wanted to convict Dr Bateman of a criminal offence: 
‘[T]he prosecution must prove the matters necessary to establish civil liability 
and...must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of the accused went 
beyond a mere  matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and 
safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving 
punishment.’15 
 
For Lord Hewart, mens rea was a vital ingredient for a conviction of gross negligence 
manslaughter. 
 
The House of Lords affirmed Lord Hewart's general description of the offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter in R v Adomako.16 
Dr Adomako, a locum anaesthetist, failed to perform basic monitoring of his patient during an 
operation and then failed to react properly to clear evidence of inadequate ventilation until too 
late.17 His patient subsequently died.  
 
The Court of Appeal addressed the question of the true legal basis for involuntary manslaughter 
by breach of duty. This was deemed to be gross negligence as opposed to recklessness.18 
Helpfully, gross negligence, the crux of the matter, was defined as proof of any of the following 
states of mind: 
a) indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health; 
b) actual foresight of the risk coupled with a determination nevertheless to run it; 
c) an appreciation of the risk coupled with an intention to avoid it but also coupled 
 with such a high degree of negligence in the attempted avoidance as the jury consider 
 justifies conviction; 
d) inattention or failure to avert to a serious risk which goes beyond ‘mere 
 inadvertence’ in respect of an obvious and important matter which the defendant's 
 duty demanded he should address.19  
 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Adomako, above n.10 at 187, per Lord Mackay  
17 R v Prentice and another; R v Adomako; R v Holloway [1993] 4 All ER 935 (CA) 952 
18 Ibid. The references to ‘reckless’ made during the other two cases heard alongside Adomako were successfully appealed 
because the jury should have been directed to consider ‘gross negligence’ instead of ‘recklessness’. 
19 Ibid. at 944.  
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Adomako’s case was then referred to the House of Lords which upheld his conviction and 
agreed that gross negligence was the test of criminality.20 Disappointingly, there was little 
comment on what turned simple negligence into gross negligence. Of this, Lord Mackay said: 
‘This will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant 
in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred. The jury 
will have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant's conduct departed from 
the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as it must have done a risk 
of death to the patient, was such that it should be judged criminal.’21 
 
These remarks seemingly left open the question of how, prospectively, a doctor can determine 
whether a medical error could result in a prison sentence; an unease that would be felt keenly 
for all those involved in the care of patients with potentially fatal illnesses. 
 
More recently Sir Brian Leveson summarised the five criticial components of the offence in R 
v Rudling, as, 
(a) the defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; 
(b) the defendant was in breach of that duty of care; 
(c) it was reasonably foreseeable that the breach gave rise to an obvious and serious risk of 
death; 
(d) the negligence did in fact cause death; 
(e) the negligence which caused death was ‘so bad in all the circumstances’ as to be 
adjudged criminal.22 
 
This approach was  confirmed in R v Rose. 23In Rose, the defendant optometrist negligently 
failed to examine the retinas of a child.24 Had she done so, she would have identified 
papilloedema, leading to a diagnosis of hydrocephalus, which, left untreated, is fatal.25 The 
defendant’s failure to examine the eyes of the child resulted in his condition being undiagnosed 
and he died some five months later. Diagnosing papilloedema and failing to take any further 
action would have been grossly negligent, but in failing to examine the eye at all the optometrist 
 
20  Adomako, above n. 10.  
21 Ibid. at 187 
22 Rudling, above n. 10, at para 18, per Sir Brian Leveson 
23 R v Rose [2017] EWCA Crim 1168, at para 77, per Sir Brian Leveson 
24 Opticians Act 1989 s.26(1) (a), ‘…it shall be his duty— (a)to perform such examinations of the eye for the purpose of 
detecting injury, disease or abnormality in the eye or elsewhere as the regulations may require…’ 
25 Papilloedema is swelling of the optic disc at the back of the eye and is associated with increased pressure within the brain. 
It is fairly easy to see with basic medical instruments and almost always indicates serious underlying pathology. 
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would not have been aware of ‘a serious and obvious risk of death’ at the time of the breach of 
duty.26 This, Sir Brian Leveson judged, precluded the offence of gross negligence and Rose 
was found simply negligent. 
 
Rose suggests that the clinician who negligently fails to examine an apparently moderately sick 
patient will fare better than the conscientious clinician who attends the same patient but fails 
to observe that they are, in fact, very sick. 27 
Herein lies the two heads of medical concern about the offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter: certainty and the degree of culpability required to merit imprisonment.  
 
Certainty 
Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits punishment without 
law. In essence, if the crime cannot be defined sufficiently for a defendant to have had prior 
knowledge of it, they cannot be convicted. This lack of certainty formed the core of the appeal 
in R v Misra and Srivistava. 28 Judge LJ opined that the law was sufficiently certain to uphold 
a conviction of gross negligence manslaughter. 29 The principle elements of the offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter are certain but the circularity generated by a definition of gross 
negligence being criminal if gross and gross if criminal had previously been outlined as a 
problem by Lord Mackay in Adomako, as was acknowledged by Judge LJ in Misra: 
 ‘It is true that to a certain extent this involves an element of circularity ... The essence 
 of the matter which is supremely a jury question is whether having regard to the risk of 
 death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as 
 to amount in their judgment to a criminal act or omission ...’ 30 
 
Effectively, this leaves a question of law to the jury; when is negligence sufficiently gross to 
be adjudged criminal? The function of a jury is to deliberate questions of fact, not law, the role 
of the judge is to direct the jury on a point of law. If, as Lodge observes, ‘following the 
 
26 Rose, above, n 23 at para 80 per Sir Brian Leveson. Commenting on the test of reasonable foreseeability his lordship said, 
‘the question of available knowledge and risk is always to be judged objectively and prospectively at the moment of the breach, 
not but for the breach.’ (para 80).  
27 This is the point made by Cath Crosby, ‘ Gross negligence manslaughter revisited: time for a change of direction?’ J. 
Crim. L 2020, 84 (3), 228-245, at 244. Commenting on the implications of the decision in Rose she notes that it ‘exculpates 
where D is ignorant of any risk only because they have failed to fulfil their duty.’  We discuss this further below. 
28 [2004] EWCA Crim 2375.  In R v Misra and Srivistava the two defendant doctors negligently failed to diagnose and treat 
a patient with sepsis who subsequently died. They unsuccesfully appealed (invoking Article 7 of the ECHR that a jury 
decision as to what turned simple negligence into criminal negligence was uncertain enough to make their conviction 
unsafe). 
29 Ibid. at  para 58 per Judge LJ. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. 
30 Adomako, above n.10  
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imposition of a gross negligence manslaughter charge, the jury is tasked with filtering out those 
failures deserving of criminal sanction’31 any degree of certainty is highly improbable when it 
is dependent on the subjective opinion of a jury.  
 
Judge LJ was dismissive of this approach and commented: 
 The question for the jury is not whether the defendant's negligence was gross, and 
 whether, additionally, it was a crime, but whether his behaviour was grossly negligent 
 and consequently criminal.32 
 
This, as Ashworth commented, ‘is a distinction without a difference and ... it should not be the 
last word on the subject'. 33  
 
What is certain about the current offence, is that if a doctor causes death through negligence 
they may end up in prison, even if they did their best with the resources available.34 A doctor 
is reliant on the jury finding that their error was blameless, relying only on the performance of 
expert witnesses and their own intuition.35 There is no means of avoiding the full force of the 
criminal law other than avoiding contact with sick patients. This is not an option for the 
conscientious clinician fulfilling a vital role in society36 but was the very message projected by 
Leveson's judgments in R v Rose37 and R v Rudling.38 
 
Laird is highly critical of the judgment in Rose, questioning who is the more blameworthy, an 
optometrist who performs an examination but misses an obvious sign or an optometrist who 
 
31 A. Lodge, 'Gross negligence manslaughter on the cusp: the unprincipled privileging of harm over culpability' (2017) 
J.Crim  L 125, at 127 
32 Misra, above n. 28 at para 62 per Judge LJ 
33 A. Ashworth, Jeremy Horder Principles of criminal law, Oxford University Press  (7th Edn) at 293 
34 In Bawa-Garba v GMC [2018] EWCA Civ 1879 it is apparent that the Appeal Court failed to explore ‘all the 
circumstances’ leading to the death of Jack Adcock. At pages 74,75 the court stated ‘Systemic failures on the part of the 
Trust were only ever of peripheral relevance to the guilt or absence of guilt of Dr Bawa-Garba for gross negligence 
manslaughter’ and, quoting the trial judge, Nicol J ‘There was a limit to how far these issues could be explored in the trial.’  
Worryingly, 'both the prosecution and the defence agreed that the report commissioned by the Trust, following Jack’s death, 
which investigated systemic failures on the part of the Trust and made recommendations for improvement, should not be 
placed before the jury.’ Ian Freckleton commenting on Dr Bawa-Garba’s case observes that ‘It was truly a situation in 
which her own errors in acuity and focus lined up with a series of other “holes in the Swiss cheese”, ‘Regulation 
of substandard medical practice: lessons from the Bawa-Garba case’ (2018) 25 JLM 603, at 623 
35 Oliver Quick, ‘Expert evidence and medical manslaughter: Vagueness in action’ [2011] 38 Journal of Law and Society 496, 
at 516. In Oliver Quick’s small study of ten medical experts he concluded that ‘such cases reply heavily on the subjective 
interpretations and judgments of experts applying their own standards to cases under review.’ 
36 The social utility of professionals taking calculated risks in difficult circumstances with limited time to make full assessments 
has long been recognised. See Watt v Herts CC [1954] 1 WLR 835 
37 It is suggested negligence protects against gross negligence, see later  Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 
QB 428; Rose above n 23  
38 Rudling, above n. 10 
9 
 
neglects to carry out any examination whatsoever? 39 Both are at fault and both, ultimately, seal 
the fate of the patient. Some clarification was given in  R v Winterton. 40 Here, the defendant, 
a construction manager, was convicted of manslaughter when a trench collapsed on a labourer. 
In upholding his conviction, the Court of Appeal held that that there was an obvious and serious 
risk of death caused by the trench which should have been apparent to Winterton. If Winterton 
alleged he was unaware of the risk, the court reasoned that he was wilfully blind or ignorant, 
which was sufficient to make him liable. Why, as Laird observes, if this defendant was liable 
for wilful ignorance was Rose also not liable? 41 The Appeal Court, however, maintained that 
Rose was factually very different; in Rose the risk would only have been obvious had the breach 
not occurred or as Laird sums up,  
‘if the risk would only have been obvious had the defendant complied with his duty of 
care, then there can be no liability.’42 
 
In Winterton the risk of the collapsing trench was obvious, the defendant was therefore liable. 
By contrast in Rose, the risk of hydrocephalus was not outwardly apparent in a seemingly 
healthy patient. The risk was only obvious if Rose had examined her patient.43  As Laird 
observes, no matter how negligent the lack of testing or examination of an ostensibly healthy 
patient, there will be no criminal liability. This leads him to conclude,‘ A divergence seems to 
be taking place in terms of how gross negligence manslaughter applies to healthcare 
professionals as opposed to others upon whom the law imposes a duty of care.’44 
 
Culpability 
The criminal law punishes individuals who have personally offended the values of the state. 
Those values ordinarily apply to all citizens without favour irrespective of the occupation of 
the actor. A professional is required to have a specific skillset as determined by the profession’s 
regulator. A failure to meet the regulator’s standard can result in both legal and professional 
sanctions. Here, it is the person as a professional who is punished, not the person as an 
 
39 K. Laird ‘The evolution of gross negligence manslaughter’ Arch. Rev. 2018 1, 6-9. See also Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 
WLR 246 para 263D-F per Lord Edmund-Davies, ‘The true position is that an error of judgment may, or may not, be negligent; 
it depends on the nature of the error. If it is one that would not have been made by a reasonably competent professional man 
professing to have the standard and type of skill that the defendant held himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care, 
then it is negligent. If, on the other hand, it is an error that such a man, acting with ordinary care, might have made, then it is 
not negligent.’  
40 R v  Winterton (Andrew) [2018] EWCA Crim 2435 
41 K. Laird  ‘Gross negligence manslaughter: R. v Winterton (Andrew)’ Crim L.R. 2019, 4 336-339 
42 Ibid. at 339  
43 This line of reasoning is seen in  Rudling, above n 10 where Sir Brian Leveson P said ‘At the time of the breach of duty, 
there must be a risk of death, not merely serious illness; the risk must be serious; and the risk must be obvious… [para 39].  
44 Ibid. at para 42.  
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individual. For a doctor, the General Medical Council (GMC) governs the standards required 
of the doctor, as a professional.45 The GMC cannot fine, imprison, or impose a gaol sentence 
on an individual.46 Underperformance, and subsequent regulatory sanction, applies solely to 
the person in their professional role and not the person as an individual. 
 
Manslaughter is a crime committed by an individual in either a personal or professional 
capacity. Professional under-performance leading to negligently caused harm is a matter for 
the GMC and the civil courts. Personal criminal activity causing harm is an issue for the 
criminal law. The professional is reprimanded by the regulator, the complainant is compensated 
by the civil courts, and the criminal is punished by the state. These distinctions are important 
as blurring these divisions risks criminalising the individual solely for professional 
underperformance. There must, it is argued, be a degree of individual, personal culpability for 
a manslaughter conviction.47 
  
English law contends that negligence, 'which goes beyond mere compensation ... regarded as 
criminal'... provides the necessary mens rea exclusively for the offence of manslaughter with 
no requirement to evaluate the defendants 'state of mind'.48  Gross negligence, however, does 
not provide the necessary mens rea for any other harm. If a surgeon is grossly negligent and 
removes the wrong limb, on the assumption that this was not a deliberate act or reckless 
conduct, the negligent surgeon will not face criminal sanction.49 Similarly, if the same surgeon 
is ‘lucky’ and their patient survives they will evade the criminal law.50 
 
A doctor who is aware that they are taking an unnecessary risk is reckless. Short of outright 
intent to cause harm, this is the most culpable state of mind associated with gross negligence 
manslaughter. However, whether a doctor is deserving of a criminal conviction by making an 
inadvertent mistake that results in the death of a patient, is not as straightforward. 
 
 
45 Through the delegated authority of the Medical Act 1983. 
46 There are a range of GMC sanctions that may be imposed to include a warning,  conditions, or referral to the Medical 
Practitioners Tribunal Service which has the power to restrict, syspend or revoke a doctor’s registration.  
47 Ashworth contends that ‘no person should be liable imprisonment without proof of sufficient fault’ Ashworth, above n. 33 
48 On this point in Attorney General reference (No. 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796 at 809 the court said,‘ Although there may be 
cases where the defendant's state of mind is relevant to the jury's consideration when assessing the grossness and criminality 
of his conduct, evidence of his state of mind is not a prerequisite to a conviction for manslaughter by gross negligence.’ 
49 Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, s.20. For a discussion of recklessness see further F.Stark Culpable Carelessness: 
Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2016) 
 
50 The concept of ‘moral luck’ is discussed later  
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Doctors maintain that it is unfair to use negligence alone, however gross, to convict them of a 
criminal offence; there must also be demonstrable culpability. In the alternative, if gross 
negligence per se does provide the necessary mens rea then this test should be available in all 
cases of harm caused by gross negligence, to do otherwise would discriminate against the 
severely injured victim. 
 
Herein lies the essence of the doctor’s dilemma: personal and professional integrity is not 
enough if you happen to be unlucky. All doctors make mistakes. Negligence occurs when 
doctors fall below their professional standards. Negligence implies a degree of inadvertence 
whether caused by bad luck, fatigue, ill-health or factors that are morally less excusable such 
as indifference or laziness. Doctors accept being found negligent if they cause harm to a patient 
by falling below an agreed standard; what is less palatable is being found criminally responsible 
if their intentions were not additionally culpable. The idea that inadvertence lacks culpability 
suggests that ‘ignorance’ protects against criminal conviction but the thrust of Power’s 
complaint51 is that something needs to be done about ‘excessively bad behaviour’, whatever 
the cause.52 Imposing ‘strict liability’ and dispensing with ‘mens rea’ altogether is to revert 
back to the court of first instance in Bateman (negligence plus death equals gross negligence) 
or adopt the situation in New Zealand until 1997.53 This is to be resisted and demonstrable 
culpability unearthed for such a serious offence. 
 
It may be possible to be culpable whilst also inadvertent, for the following reason: if a doctor 
has the capacity to make a different choice but declines to do so, this is blameworthy.54 This is 
not the same as having made a conscious choice at that particular time; it merely reflects the 
doctor’s capacity to have acted differently. This state of mind is culpable by virtue of being 
unexercised capacity. Not engaging one’s full capacity is, arguably, morally wrong if serious 
harm may result.55 For Dr Bawa-Garba, this ‘unexercised capacity’ translated as an ability to 
 
51 Powers, above n.3. 
52 Lord Diplock’s sentiments ran along similar lines when he said ‘where the subject matter … is the regulation of a particular 
activity involving potential danger to public health, safety or morals..., the court may feel driven … to impose by penal 
sanctions a higher duty of care on those who choose to participate and to place upon them an obligation to take whatever 
measures may be necessary to prevent the prohibited act, ... in order to fulfil the ordinary common law duty of care. But such 
an inference is not lightly to be drawn … unless there is something that the person ... may be expected to influence or control, 
which will promote the observance of the obligation’ in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL) at 163  
53 This is one of the potential alternatives considered to the present test and discussed later. 
54 HLA Hart “Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibilty’ in ‘Punishment and Responsibility Essays In the Philosophy 
of Law’ Oxford University Press pp136-157. See also M. Moore and H. Hurd “Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak 
and the Selfish; The Culpability of Negligence’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 147 
55 Ibid 
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have refused the onerous duties asked of her, given her recent return to work, staff shortages, 
absence of a senior colleague etc.56 She also had the capacity to request help during the day but 
failed to fully exercise this. She was ‘far from being a bad person’57 but demonstrated a degree 
of culpability as she chose not to engage herself to her optimum capacity. Whether this degree 
of culpability is deserving of criminal sanction is questionable. What is incontrovertible is the 
cost, in career terms, to Dr Bawa Garba of exercising her right to choose not to work on that 
ward or to disturb her supervising consultant who was in another hospital. This, however, opens 
up a whole Pandora’s box of questionable ‘medical establishment conventions’ and falls 
outside the remit of this article.58 
 
Other options – is there a better way?  
The preceding paragraphs have provided a brief insight into the problems with the current law. 
Finding a replacement test is an altogether trickier task. The Law Commission’s proposed 
replacement of killing by gross carelessness was dismissed by Quick as ‘nothing more than a 
linguistic modernization of the status quo, which ‘fails to address the fundamental objection to 
negligence-based criminal liability.’59 He favours the test put forward by Tadros which focuses 
on the breach of duty of the perpetrator either by failing to investigate risks or by being wilfully 
blind to the existence of a risk.60 However, this approach would possibly incarcerate doctors 
such as Prentice and Sullman who failed to investigate the risks of injecting drugs intrathecally 
even though their fatal omission to investigate risk was borne though ignorance, not 
indifference. 61Objectively, by way of contrast to the hypothetical ‘reasonable person’, they 
were reckless but subjectively, given their inexperience and all the circumstances they found 
themselves in, they were merely negligent. A more satisfactory stance is that taken by Mullock 
who maintains that the appropriate basis for liability is subjective recklessness 62 or McCall 
Smith who contends that prosecutions should only occur when there is reckless conduct and 
 
56  Bawa-Garba, above n. 2.  Dr.Bawa-Garba was recently convicted of the manslaughter of an already very sick child.  
57  Paraphrased from the trial judge sentencing Drs Sullman and Prentice, quoted in Brazier and Alghrani, "Fatal Medical 
Malpractice and Criminal Liability" (2009) 25 Journal of Professional Negligence 51, at 56. 
58 Junior doctors are trainees who are supposed to be under supervision (Dr Bawa-Garba, Dr Prentice, Dr Sullman, Dr Misra). 
The consultant who supervised Dr Bawa-Garba from a separate hospital was made aware of Jack Adcock's highly abnormal 
blood results but chose not to see the child. The Courts and GMC chose to regard this as her failure to engage him in the 
management of a patient who was, ultimately, under his care. 
59Erin & Ost, above n. 8 (eds),  O. Quick “Medical Manslaughter: The Rise and Replacement of a Contested Crime’ at  47 
60 See V Tadros, “Recklessness and the Duty to Take Care’ in S. Shute and A.P Simester “Criminal Law Theory:Doctrines of 
the General Part (Oxford University Press), 2002, 227-58 at 255. 
61 Prentice and Sullman, above n.17 
62 Alexandra Mullock ‘Gross Negligence (Medical) Manslaughter and the Puzzling Implications of Negligent Ignorance: Rose 
v R [2017] EWCA Crim 1168’ Medical Law Review Vol 26, No 2 pages 346-356 
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the perpetrator ‘deliberately and culpably took a risk with their patients.’ 63Along similar lines, 
Brazier opines that ‘only such conduct pursued with disregard for the life of others should merit 
punishment.’64 More recently, Crosby advocates that gross negligence manslaughter is 
replaced with reckless manslaughter using a capacity-based approach that emphasises the need 
to ‘appreciate a risk and the context in which the proscribed conduct occurred.’ Whilst the 
move towards greater recognition of ‘all the circumstances’ is to be welcomed, a test founded 
in negligence would, it is contended, more clearly define the error from the violation.65 
 
The case for a test of subjective recklessness has always been highly persuasive but has thus 
far failed to gain traction outside of academia. Therefore, having outlined the problems with 
English law and gross negligence manslaughter the debate now broadens to explore a wider 
range of alternatives to the present regime. Beginning with a review of two jurisdictions’ 
approach to gross negligence manslaughter the discussion then advocates a new model, 
grounded in clinical experience and adhering to already established legal principles, which may 
yet salvage an offence labelled as ‘something of a dog's breakfast'.66 
 
Lessons from over the seas and closer to home 
Scotland and New Zealand have adopted very different stances to gross negligence 
manslaughter. Scottish law places culpability at the heart of the test for culpable homicide; 
mens rea is centre stage. New Zealand has all but abandoned the criminal law in its 
regulation of doctors.  In contrast,  English law has repeatedly stressed that the defendant’s 
state of mind may not be relevant and that the criminal law has a role in the regulation of 
doctors.67 It is difficult to see how all three positions can be right. The paragraphs below 
examine the Scottish and New Zealand regimes more closely. 
 
Scotland  
In Scottish criminal law, there is no such offence as gross negligence manslaughter. There is 
culpable homicide, which is either voluntary or involuntary.68 These broadly resemble English 
 
63 A. McCall Smith ‘ Criminal Negligence and the Incompetent Doctor’  1 Medical Law Review pp 336-349 
64  Erin & Ost, above n. 8, M. Brazier and N. Allen ‘ Criminalising Medical Malpractice’ Ch 2 pp15-27, at 27 
65 Crosby, above n.27  
66 Moore and Hurd, above n.54, at 192. 
67 See Attorney General, above n.48; Misra, above n. 28 
68 The law is currently under review but the proposed changes mainly concern the employers of those found guilty of the 
offence. See Scottish Parliament website <www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/110169.aspx> accessed 12th June 
2020 
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voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. It is an involuntary culpable homicide which would, 
perhaps, capture the essence of gross negligence manslaughter.69 
 
The mens rea of this type of unintentional, but nevertheless, culpable homicide is 'gross, or 
wicked negligence, something amounting, or at any rate analogous, to an indifference to 
consequences'70  
 
Nevertheless, in keeping with subjective recklessness, it is emphasised that an analysis of 
defendant's state of mind is crucial to any conviction: 
[M]ens rea is, and remains, a necessary and significant element in the crime of (‘lawful 
act’) culpable homicide. That element may… be proved in various ways, including 
proof by inference from proven facts. But it is …erroneous to suppose that the actual 
state of mind of a person accused of culpable homicide of this kind can be ignored and 
guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of  proof that the conduct in question 
fell below an objectively set standard 71  
 
This constitutes a degree of contemporaneous awareness, on the part of the defendant, that they 
were taking a risk that would be considered unnecessary by reference to a ‘reasonable person’. 
Inadvertence, unless grounded in an intention to be unaware of risks, will not suffice.72  In most 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, the difference between recklessness and negligence hinges on 
this contemporary awareness of risk. 73 
 
 
69 For a fuller exposition see, for example McDiarmid, C. (2018). Killings short of murder: culpable homicide in Scots law. In 
A. Reed, M. Bohlander, N. Wake, E. Engleby, & V. Adams (Eds.), Homicide in Criminal Law: A Research Companion (pp. 
21-36). (Substantive Issues in Criminal Law). London. 
70 Transco v HM Advocate (2004) JC 29, at  [33] per Lord Osborne 
71 Ibid, at [38] per Lord Hamilton, in keeping with Lord Hewart’s requirement for demonstrable mens rea in R v Bateman, 
above n. 48 
72 Moore and Hurd,  above n. 54 at 192. Also R v Reid [1992] 3 All ER 673 
73 F.Stark above n.49 at 65. The following extract from the American Model Penal Code (MPC) illustrates a convergence 
amongst Anglo-American jurisdictions of what Stark calls a Standard Account of culpability:  
Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offence when he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's 
situation. 
Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offence when he should be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances 
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's 
situation. 
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The English offence recognises that recklessness contains all the ingredients required of gross 
negligence and that mere negligence is not enough. However, the Scottish system does nothing 
to fill the gap between mere negligence and recklessness. Gross negligence manslaughter 
includes not only a conscious disregard but also inadvertence in respect of an obvious matter 
which the defendant should have addressed. 74 The parallels with subjective and objective 
recklessness are plain to see: did the defendant foresee the risk and take it anyway (subjective) 
or was the defendant blind to the risk which would have been blatantly obvious to another 
professional in the same position (objective)? 75 
 
Culpability is key to both Scottish and English law but whereas the former only find culpability 
in a contemporaneous conscious disregard, the latter regard manifestly poor performance as 
culpable in its own right. 
 
There is another approach, which deals with fatal professional incompetence by mending the 
defendant as opposed to simply punishing them. 
 
New Zealand 
Under New Zealand Law manslaughter is a form of culpable homicide which may be 
committed by an unlawful act, or an omission without lawful excuse to perform or observe a  
legal duty, or by both combined.76 An ‘unlawful act’, under New Zealand law, must be a 
criminal offence, and is defined to mean a breach of any Act, regulation, rule or bylaw.77 
Generally, though not exclusively, an ‘unlawful act’ relates to public safety. To be unlawful, a 
relevant act must be accompanied by the corresponding mental state (mens rea) to make it an 
offence, and it must be done without lawful justification or excuse. Where medical 
professionals are implicated in the death of a patient, and a police prosecution follows, a charge 
of manslaughter may be based on either an ‘unlawful act’ or the failure ‘to perform a legal 
duty.’ However, the degree to which the defendant must have deviated from an accepted 
 
74  Adomako, above n. 10  
75‘It is clearly blameworthy to take an obvious and significant risk of causing injury to another. But it is not clearly 
blameworthy to do something involving a risk of injury to another if … one genuinely does not perceive the risk. Such a person 
may fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of those failings should expose him to conviction of 
serious crime or the risk of punishment. R v G [2003] UKHL 50 [32] per Lord Bingham 
76 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s  160 (2) 
77 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s 2(1) 
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standard has seen substantial change in the last two decades.  The case of R v Yogasakaran78 
was probably the catalyst for this change. 
At the end of routine surgery, a patient bit down on their breathing tube and effectively cut off 
their own oxygen supply. This is not an unusual occurrence and many anaesthetists will insert 
a bite block to prevent this from happening. Other anaesthetists will simply wait until the biting 
stops and then remove the tube. Occasionally, the patient will bite so hard and for so long that 
the tube becomes occluded and they begin to turn blue. Dr Yogasakaran’s patient did just this 
so he quite reasonably decided to administer doxapram to hasten emergence from anaesthesia 
(and thus terminate the biting). Unfortunately, the ampoule he opened and administered in haste 
was dopamine and not doxapram. The two very different drugs had been erroneously put 
together in the same container by a third party. Dr Yogasakaran could not explain what had 
happened based on the assumption of doxapram administration, consequently he further 
examined the opened ampoules and volunteered the error he had made to the receiving 
intensive care team. Unfortunately, the patient had sustained fatal physiological stresses and 
died shortly later. Dr Yogasakaran’s honest mistake resulted in a patient death and 
Yogasakaran’s criminal conviction. 
Yogasakaran committed his fatal blunder in 1987 and this was proceeded by a number of cases 
with varying degrees of culpability.79 Naturally, there was widespread unease amongst the 
medical profession and after much lobbying, the Act was amended in 1997. 
The Crimes Amendment Act 1997 added a new s150A to the Crimes Act 1961.  Liability for 
manslaughter by failure to perform a legal duty, now required proof of a ‘major departure’ 
from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person. 80 Since 2012, the same threshold 
test now also applies in instances where manslaughter by an unlawful act is founded on proof 
of negligence. Effectively, as in England, this brings negligent acts or omissions under the same 
umbrella where there exists a duty of care. 
Since 1997, when the ordinary negligence threshold was lifted to effectively one of gross 
negligence, there has been only one case of alleged medical manslaughter.81 This case came 
 
78 R v Yogasakaran [1990] 1 NZLR 399 
79 Erin and Ost, above n.8, A. Merry “When Are Errors a Crime? – Lessons from New Zealand’ p67-97, at 75-77 and R v 
Morrison,  High Court, Dunedin, CR 7/91, 23 April 1991 
80 This law change is  reflected in  the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Powell [2002] 1 NZLR 152 whereby 
the “major departure” test was held to apply not only to manslaughter by omission to perform a legal duty, but also to 
manslaughter under s 160 (2)(a) by an unlawful act involving either carelessness or negligence 
81 That case, in 2006, did not involve a doctor but a midwife who was found not guilty for the management of a difficult breech 
delivery which resulted in the child’s death. See K. Wallis, ‘Professional Accountability of doctors in New Zealand’ (2013 5 
(2) Journal of Primary Healthcare. 
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following a period of ten years (1996 -2006) during which no health practitioner had been 
convicted of medical manslaughter, leading Professor Ron Paterson to suggest that there was 
‘no realistic prospect of revival of the use of the criminal law in this area.’ 82  
 
Although there have been a handful of prosecutions of health practitioners in New Zealand 
since the 1997 reforms, the place and usefulness of the criminal law in a medical context is 
now an increasingly rare event.83 Prosecutions for medical manslaughter, it seems, have ‘all 
but ceased’.84 However, since the changes in the Crimes Act health professionals and 
providers have been encouraged  to report any unintended, unexpected or unplanned events to 
the Health Quality & Safety Commission. The Commission runs an Adverse Events Learning 
Programme which reviews events and shares lessons learned in order to improve consumer 
safety.85 
 
Comment on the Major Departure Test 
Academics such as Oliver Quick contend, one of the criticisms of the concept of ‘gross 
negligence’ is the very vagueness of the offence. In Quick’s assessment, the offence is too 
broad for prosecutorial judgment to be applied consistently, and this means that prosecutions 
impact very harshly  on those ‘operating in error-ridden activities who are exposed to risk of 
prosecution by virtue of their socially vital work, and often at the mercy of moral luck.’86 What 
may be true of ‘gross negligence’ is arguably true of the ‘major departure’ test, despite the view 
expressed that ‘[t]he major departure’ is a ‘good formulation and avoids any difficulties which 
might be thought to apply to the term ‘gross negligence.’ 87 While it is correct, that the major 
departure test focuses on the behaviour rather than the result, it too is plagued by the same 
uncertainties and vagueness that bedevil the gross negligence model; indeed, any test where a 
subjective epithet is applied. In New Zealand, however, the virtual abandonment of criminal 
prosecutions for medical manslaughter is evidence that they have seemingly adopted the view 
 
82 R Paterson, ‘The Good Doctor’ (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2012), at 51.  
83 Merry & Brookbanks, above n. 6 at 315-318 and see R Paterson, ‘From prosecution to rehabilitation: New Zealand’s 
response to health professional negligence ‘ in D Griffiths and  A sanders (eds),  Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law 
(Vol 2) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), at  244. 
84 PDG Skegg,’Medical acts hastening death’ in P Skegg and R Paterson (eds) Health  Law in New Zealand  (Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2015) 616. 
85 See ‘Criminal charges for medical error ‘very rare’ in NZ, says legal expert’ Health Central/ Pokapū Hauora, August 16, 
2018  https://healthcentral.nz/manslaugfhter-charges-for-medical-error-very-rare-in-nz-says-legal-expert/ last accessed  25 
June 2020. 
86 Erin and Ost, above n.8, O Quick, ‘Prosecuting ‘Gross’ Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion and the CPS’ (2006) 
(33) (3) Journal of Law and Society 421, at 449. 
87 New Zealand Medical Law Reform Group Submission to Justice and Law Reform Select Committee, Crimes Amendment 
Bill (No 5) 1996, “Medical Manslaughter” ,  submission 5. 
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of Ron Paterson who maintains that most New Zealand patient advocacy groups, doctors and 
lawyers are now agreed that the criminal law should only be used in healthcare settings in cases 
of deliberate harm or recklessness.  
 
A new model – the foundations 
A criticism of the current offence is that it is not so concerned with the contexts in which 
negative events occur, but singularly focussed on assessing responsibility for discrete acts of 
wrongdoing. Such a model is clearly inappropriate in assigning blame in medical settings, 
where context is everything. Ashworth contends that for conduct to be criminal there must be 
harm and culpability.88 Harm requires no further discussion in the context of gross negligence 
manslaughter although as argued later, the justification of criminal liability should not be 
dependent on whether the patient lives or dies, but the conduct should be judged ‘in terms of 
its effect on valued interests.’89  Culpability requires a fuller argument. Currently, the 
defendant’s state of mind is not necessarily relevant to a finding of gross negligence 
manslaughter,90the grossness of the negligence per se provides the necessary mens rea: in short,  
was the defendant’s conduct sufficiently bad to merit criminal sanction.   
 
Errors v Violations 
Merry and Brookbanks state ‘morally relevant wrongdoing can only properly be identified if 
the actions of those whose responsibility is in question are subjected to analysis designed to 
identify states of mind that are truly culpable.’91 They continue by giving a detailed analysis of 
unintentional medical deaths by synthesising the perspectives of an eminent legal mind and a 
doctor practising the most manslaughter prone specialty of them all, anaesthesia.92 For Merry 
and Brookbanks, two broad groups of mistakes prevail; the ‘error’ and the ‘violation’. An error 
is the sort of mistake that could be made by anyone just by simply being a human rather than 
a machine. They define an error in colloquial terms as ‘when one tries to do the right thing but 
actually does the wrong thing.’ 93 Scientific evidence suggests that many doctors will commit 
 
88 A. Ashworth ‘Is the Criminal Law a lost cause’ L.Q. R. 2000 Vol 116 p225-256, at 241 
89 Ibid. at 240. As Tadros opines ‘outcomes need not reflect a high degree of culpability’ (see V Tadros “Fair Labelling and 
Social Solidarity’ in ‘Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth’ 
(ed Zedner and Roberts), at 67 
90 Attorney General reference (No. 2 of 1999), above n. 48 
91 Merry &  Brookbanks, above n 6, at 12 
92 Ibid..at page 16 
93 Ibid. at 108. The authors continue and propose a more formal definition of an unintentional error as one which ‘involves 
the use of a flawed decision or plan to achieve an aim, or the failure to carry out a planned action as intended.’ (at 109). 
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this type of error at some point in their working life and anecdotal evidence suggests that most 
anaesthetists will make this kind of mistake during their careers.94 Errors are further subdivided 
but all are viewed as lacking any culpable elements with the exception of the ‘egregious error’ 
which equates to the ‘grossest ignorance’ described in Williamson.95 This might relate to a 
culpable attitude, but a failure of regulation may also feature. In their view, with the exception 
of the said egregious error, errors cannot be culpable as they are actions which ‘do not represent 
an informed choice of the resulting harm.’96 For Merry and Brookbanks, it is the ability or the 
unexercised capacity to do things differently that is a necessary ingredient for culpability and 
criminal sanction.97  
 
‘Violations’ are defined as intentional deviations ‘from those practices deemed necessary… to 
maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system.’ 98 The doctor has made a 
decision ‘to do something in the knowledge that the given action or decision will place at risk 
some aspect of safety or of the system.’99 Although acknowledging that not all violations will 
be equally culpable, Merry and Brookbanks contend that violations will always be 
blameworthy ‘because violations involve choice.’100 However, an assessment of the clinician’s 
actions should not confuse what ‘could reasonably be expected to have been done’ with ‘what 
ought to have been done.’101  A violation may indeed be reprehensible depending on the reason 
for it; a lazy short-cut or a well-reasoned aberration. However, the violation must considered 
in the context of ‘all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred.’  
 
Can Negligence be culpable? 
Negligence implies ignorance or inadvertence, and a negligent doctor should not be criminally 
liable for a momentary lapse of concentration or inadvertence; an error of judgment. However,  
the imposition of criminal liability may be apposite for a doctor who has a wilful disregard for 
 
94 Jon Maskill’s own experience of himself and colleagues over the last 25 years of anaesthetic practice. See also A Merry D 
Peck ‘Anaesthetists, errors in drug administration and the law’ [1995] 108 New Zealand Medical Journal 185 
95 Merry and Brookbanks, above n.6, at  138.; R v Williamson [1807] NSWC 3 C and P 635 
96  Ibid, at 388.  
97  Bawa-Garba above n.2. Dr Bawa-Garba had the choice not to work on the under-resourced ward and Dr Sullman had a 
choice not to perform a lumbar puncture. However, for a junior doctor to refuse work delegated to them by a consultant is 
highly unusual. Dr Sellu did have a choice to refer his patient earlier but did not. Dr Adomako did have a choice to properly 
monitor his patient with a degree of vigilance proportionate to the situation but did not. See also HLA Hart “Negligence, Mens 
Rea and Criminal Responsibilty’ in Punishment and Responsibility Essays In the Philosophy of Law Oxford University Press 
pp136-157. 
98  Merry and Brookbanks, above n.6, at 150 referring to J Reason, Human Error (New York, Cambrdige University Press, 
1990), 195 
99 Ibid. at 150  
100 Ibid. at 389 
101 Ibid, at 389 
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the safety of others, a doctor guilty of a violation. But, if negligent conduct is culpable, and 
labelled a violation, three factors must be present.  
 
(i) Awareness 
The defendant must be aware that there is a risk if they omit to act or elect to act in a certain 
way. Horder concurs that ‘criminal culpability is defensible where a defendant either knows of 
a risk, or at least suspects that a risk exists despite the existence of contrary reasons which 
should have dissuaded the actor from engaging in the conduct.’102  For a finding of gross 
negligence manslaughter there must be ‘some conscious, occurrent awareness of a risk of harm 
to others, wilful blindness or cognitive dissonance in respect of such a risk.’103 This concept 
must, include the defendant who was wilfully ignorant of the risk; ignorance must not be 
exploited to excuse blame. This awareness is not necessarily tied to the time of the event, an 
accused may be aware of a threat before the incident, for example at the ‘preparatory’ stage yet 
the defendant fails to take steps to minimise or avoid the risk by his subsequent actions.104 A 
degree of awareness may also be present in a simple negligent action, for example the motorist 
who drives at an excessive speed in a built-up area or an employer who fails to provide safety 
helmets. All are aware that there are risks attached to their actions or inactions. Awareness of 
the risk is therefore only one factor.  
 
(ii) Choice 
 The defendant must have exercised a conscious choice to act (or omit to act). The grossly 
negligent doctor, being aware of the danger, has weighed up the reasons for and against action. 
105 Against the backdrop of the defendant’s recognition of the risks, the element of choice is 
key– blame should only attach to the defendant’s conduct if the defendant could have chosen 
to act differently and it is this ability to make a choice that distinguishes the criminally culpable 
doctor from the negligent doctor. The former being aware of the risk has consciously chosen 
to run, ignore, chance their luck, be indifferent to, act with a cavalier attitude, in essence act 
illogically and reach a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable person could ever have 
 
102 Horder J, ‘Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability’ (1997) 47 (4) University of Toronto Law Journal 495 at 512 
103 Lodge, above n.31. Such behaviour is labelled reckless by Anne Lodge but we suggest more generally may be used to 
distinguish the criminal conduct from simple negligence.  
104 For a doctor, this may include failing to keep up to date with important professional safety issues. Doctors receive 
important safety updates from their Royal College, GMC and public health bodies in addition to their employers mandatory 
training sessions. 
105 Ibid. Anne Lodge refers to the  ‘choice theory' which proposes’ blame is only justified if the agent could have chosen 
otherwise than he did.’  
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come to it. 106 Fatigue is cited as increasing the chances of both error and violation and the 
incidence of which is evident in many of the prosecuted manslaughter cases. 107  Merry and 
Brookbanks contends that accepting elective work whilst fatigued is a violation of a safe 
practice.108  The doctor made the choice to run an unnecessary risk and has the capacity to 
refuse to work in contrast to the doctor in Accident & Emergency who has a duty to treat all 
who come through the department’s doors.  It is acknowledged that often there are complex 
reasons involving issues of healthcare resources and organisation that may result in a doctor 
electing to commit occasional violations with the most laudable of aims. However, a doctor 
accepting elective work who willingly decides to run a risk in the face of an alternative course 
of action has committed a violation.  
 
(iii) Control 
Husak writes that ‘a state of affairs is under our control when we have the ability to alter it if 
given a reason to do so.’109 For a doctor’s actions to fall within the auspices of the criminal law 
the doctor must have had the ability to alter the chain of events. So, for the fatigued A&E doctor 
referred to above this element of control is absent. They may be aware of the risks of continuing 
to work, but they have no control over the lack of staff cover that necessitates that they must 
carry on. The circumstances faced by this doctor mean they are not to blame. 
 
Taking these elements; awareness, choice and control and additionally importing principles 
from public law the next section outlines a new model for gross negligence manslaughter, 
which better defines the boundary between criminal negligence and tortious negligence. This 
 
106 Ibid.We would agree with Lodge that ‘An inadvertent defendant, wholly unaware of the risk (even one that would be 
immediately apparent to a reasonable observer in circumstances where conduct-guiding rules are established) does not make 
such a choice and thus does not render themselves vulnerable to criminal conviction.’ See Bolitho v City of Hackney HA 
[1997] 3 WLR 1151 and  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 and’ 
Wednesbury unreasonableness’ discussed in the next section. 
107 See Drew Dawson & Kathryn Reid ‘Fatigue, alcohol and performance impairment’ [1997] 388 Nature 235. There are 
several examples of fatigue being a factor in cases of gross negligence. Mr Garg had been on duty for 8 days R v Garg [2012] 
EWCA Crim 2520, [2013] 2 Cr App Rep (S) 203, Dr Adomako had a maximum of 4 hours sleep R v Prentice and another; R 
v Adomako; R v Holloway [1993] 4 All ER 935 (CA), Dr Urbani was said to have been exhausted ‘Exhausted relief doctor 
gave patient fatal dose’ The Guardian, 4th May 2009 and in Canada Dr Verbrugge was accused of actually being asleep 
‘Anesthesiologist Found Negligent in Boy's Death’ New York Times October 24th 1996  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/24/us/anesthesiologist-found-negligent-in-boy-s-death.html> accessed 10th June 2020 
108 Merry and Brookbanks, above n. 6 , a 170 
109 Husak.’Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting” Crim Law and Philos (2011) 
5:199-218 Alexander and Ferzan in their discussion of if beliefs or desires are under our control, contend that ‘one is not 
culpable for one’ ignorance unless one is in control of it.’ Husak disagrees with this view and contends that if beliefs and 
desires are outside our control then ‘it is hard to see how actions can be under our control.’ 
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sliding scale of negligence will delineate more clearly the defendant’s wrongdoing and 
assessment of culpability. 
 
The sliding scale of negligence 
The courts have indicated that an analysis of the defendant’s state of mind need not be a pre-
requisite for a conviction,110 therefore the focus of the present test is principally on how far 
below a professional standard the defendant’s conduct fell. If the conduct itself solely provides 
the necessary mens rea (as suggested by Judge LJ in Misra)111 then any newly advanced model 
must be capable of differentiating between actions that are merely negligent,  from acts that 
might properly labelled a violation. Consequently, as the emphasis is on the degree of 
negligence necessary to be considered criminally culpable this new test is labelled the ‘sliding 
scale of negligence.’   
 
The discussion begins at the start of the sliding scale with a critique of the tests used to establish 
civil liability before using as a backdrop the case of Adomako and the clinical negligence cases 
of Barnett and Bolitho,112 advocating that civil and administrative law can be utilised in a new 
gross negligence manslaughter test.  It is contended that when the end point of the sliding scale 
is reached and the defendant’s behaviour is illogical or egregious  negligence should be ajudged 
as gross and potentially culpable.  
 
The starting point - simple negligence and the Bolam test 
In civil and criminal law it is accepted that a doctor owes a duty of care to their patient and in 
both a criminal and clinical negligence claim the claimant must establish a breach of that duty. 
The standard of care in civil law in a clinical negligence case is governed by the Bolam Test.113 
A doctor must attain 
 ‘…. the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special 
skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is 
 
110 Attorney General reference, above n. 48, at 809;  Misra above n. 28 at paras 56,57 
 
111  Misra, above n.28 at paras 56,57 
112 Bolitho, above n.106; Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee  [1968] 2 WLR 422 
113 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 
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sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that 
particular art.” (per McNair J).114 
 
The threshold for establishing clinical negligence is a difficult one for a claimant to prove made 
even more so as there is likely to be more than one form of accepted practice. This point was 
explicitly recognised by McNair J, who stressed that the court should not find the defendant 
negligent simply on the basis there was ‘a body of opinion that takes the contrary view.’ 115 
 
The Bolam test has been the subject of extensive criticism. It has been viewed as the epitome 
of self-regulation, at its worst regarded as allowing the negligent doctor to escape liability by 
simply calling on other doctors to endorse the lowest common denominator in clinical 
practice.116  Bolam seemingly permitted the courts to adopt a descriptive approach to the expert 
evidence, if there were other doctors, that might have behaved as the defendant did then the 
defendant will have acted with ordinary care and will not be in breach of duty. The role of the 
court became solely to determine the existence of an accepted practice that would endorse the 
defendant’s actions.  If such a body of evidence existed, the defendant would not be negligent. 
117  Norrie argued that what was required was a normative interpretation of Bolam and the 
expert evidence and that the courts should be seen to engage with the expert evidence. 118 A 
normative approach asks 'is this what doctors should do' specifically what should be done in 
the circumstances rather than ascertaining, is this what doctors ordinarily do. Norrie 
maintained that McNair’s reference to the ‘reasonable’ doctor permitted the court to take into 
account all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case. 119 However, the 
 
114 Ibid at page 587.  The forerunner to the Bolam test was the Scottish case of Hunter v. Hanley 1955 SC 200; 1955 SLT 213, 
Lord President Clyde stating, ‘The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is 
whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of, if acting with ordinary 
care.’ 
115 Ibid  
116 See K Norrie Medical Negligence: who sets the standard? JME 1985, 11, 135-137. 116  Norrie contends that medical practice 
is aimed at treating the particular patient who has their own particular needs rather that simply providing treatment to that type 
of patient. He concludes that ‘Medical treatment is not determined by plebiscite: neither is its legal acceptability.’ 
117 Jose Miola  ‘Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee: Medical Law’s Accordion’ in Landmark Cases in Medical 
Law, (2015).  page 23 (Bloomsbury Publishing) Cases such as Whitehouse v Jordan  (above n. 36) and Defreitas v O’Brien 
(1995) 25 BMLR 51 are good illustrations of the court deferential approach to medical expert evidence. 
118 K Norrie, ‘Common Practice and the Standard of Care in Medical Negligence’ [1985] Juridical Review 145 
119 Ibid at 152. Miola (above n.117) argues that McNair did not intend the judiciary to continually defer to accepted practice 
and had actually given the judiciary license to prefer one body of medical evidence over another, ‘it is not essential for you to 
decide which of the two practices is the better practice, as long as you accept that what….[the doctor] did was in accordance 
with a practice accepted by proper persons; but if the result of the evidence is that you are satisfied that this practice is better 
than the practice spoken of on the other side, then that is a stronger case.’ ( Bolam at 587) 
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aftermath of Bolam was characterised by innate reluctance by the judiciary to question medical 
opinion.120 
 
Falling short of the Bolam test rarely led to a finding of criminality, the negligent doctor who 
failed to comply with accepted practice was not usually the doctor who also exhibited such ‘a 
gross dereliction of care.’121 Negligence simply describes the harm resulting from a breach of 
duty with no element of culpability implied. The Bolam test is only the first point on the 
sliding scale of negligence. 
 
Logic and Lacunas – moving along the scale 
In the clinical negligence case Bolitho v City of Hackney HA the defendant doctor negligently 
failed to attend Patrick Bolitho who subsequently suffered respiratory arrest and later died.122 
Commenting on the Bolam test and the use of expert evidence Lord Browne-Wilkinson said 
the proposed medical opinion must have a logical basis and that, 
‘…, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits and 
have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter.’123 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson acknowledged that it would only be in a ‘rare case’ that the expert 
opinion would not be ‘capable of withstanding logical analysis’, and, 
‘It is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert opinion cannot be 
logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the benchmark by reference 
to which the defendant's conduct falls to be assessed.’ 124 
 
Logic is regarded as a particular way of thinking, a deduction/inference, i.e. if ‘X then Y.’ A 
logical decision is one that is reasonable and founded on good judgment.  Whether an 
individual’s reasoning is logical is not the same question as whether their decision was 
reasonable in all the circumstances. The majority of clinical negligence cases that reach the 
civil courts involve a normative appraisal of the evidence, a value judgment in which the courts 
decide if the approach adopted was ‘reasonable in the circumstances’; not if it was the only 
 
120 See for example Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 2 WLR 
480 at 487 'The law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgment' (per Lord Scarman); 
Maynard v West Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 634 at 639  ‘A court may prefer one body of opinion to the other: but that is 
no basis for a conclusion of negligence’ (per Lord Scarman). Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246  above n. 36 
121  Adomako, above n. 10 
122 Bolitho, above n.106. The defendant argued however that even if she had attended she would not have intubated Patrick 
and thus prevented his injuries. Ultimately, this argument was accepted and the claimant’s case failed on causation.  
123 Ibid, at page1159  
124 Ibid, at page 1160  
25 
 
right answer. The use of logic in Bolitho was arguably the wrong call as what was required was 
a proper analysis of the risks and benefits of intubating.  Reading the judgment of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson it is not evident in Bolitho that any such analysis occurred, 
 
‘Intubation is not routine, risk-free process…It cannot be suggested that it was illogical for Dr 
D, a most distinguished expert, to favour running what, in his view, was a small risk of total 
respiratory collapse rather than submit [the child] to the invasive procedure of intubation.’ 125 
 
Notwithstanding the questionable use of the term ‘logic’ Bolitho has been said to put a gloss126 
on the Bolam test, the medical practice that the defendant doctor relies on must not only be 
Bolam compatible but Bolitho compliant; it must be both reasonable and logical. Perhaps, as 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated, only in those very rare circumstances127 where it is glaringly 
obvious that the defendant should have adopted another course of action that the courts will 
intervene but nonetheless the courts can and have intervened when the accepted practice is 
adjudged as logically indefensible. 128 
 
Could logic be utilised in a new test for gross negligence manslaughter?  The majority of 
clinical negligence cases that are ‘logically indefensible’ are likely to be settled simply 
because the internal consistency of the expert evidence does not add up. However, is an 
illogical doctor, a doctor whose actions ‘cannot logically be supported at all’,129 so far 
removed from the grossly negligent doctor? A grossly negligent doctor is considered to have 
behaved illogically where there has been blatant disregard for accepted practice or adherence 
to an outdated practice and they have failed to recognise the risks in their approach could 
cause the death of a patient.  
 
Lodge writes that “in the criminal context negligence requires unreasonable risk-
taking.’130Substitute ‘illogical’ for ‘unreasonable’; would that produce a test that avoids 
needing to determine the ‘grossness’ of the negligence? 
 
 
125 Ibid  
126 See M Brazier and J Miola, “Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution? (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 85 
127 Bolitho, above n. 106, at page 1160 
128 See for example Marriott v West Midlands HA [1999] Lloyds Rep Med 23; Fallon v Wilson [2010] EWHC 2978; Pearce 
v United Bristol Healthcare NHST (1998) 48 BMLR 118 
129 Bolitho, above n. 106, at page 1160 
130 Lodge, above n 31, at 125 
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In his analysis of a logical practice, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to the judgment of Sachs 
LJ in Hucks v Cole as being one of those rare cases where the accepted practice was illogical. 
‘When the evidence shows that a lacuna in professional practice exists by which risks 
of grave danger are knowingly taken, then, however small the risk, the court must 
anxiously examine that lacuna … If the court finds … there is no proper basis for the 
lacuna, and that it is definitely not reasonable that those risks should have been taken, 
its function is to state that fact and where necessary to state that it constitutes 
negligence."131 
 
In Hucks, the doctor failed to prescribe penicillin to a patient following childbirth resulting in 
her contracting puerperal fever. There was no logical explanation for not electing to prescribe 
a drug that was inexpensive, widely available and could minimise if not eliminate a known 
risk. A scenario where there is a known risk X therefore follow step Y to minimise that risk. In 
Bolitho, the courts in judging the defendant not negligent for failing to intubate seemed to set 
the bar very high for a finding of illogical conduct. Previously, in Bolitho, in  the Court of 
Appeal, LJ Dillon referred to the judgment of Sachs LJ in Hucks, stated that the courts should 
only reject medical opinion, 
‘if the court, fully conscious of its own lack of medical knowledge and clinical 
experience, was none the less clearly satisfied that the views of that group of doctors 
were Wednesbury unreasonable, i.e. views such as no reasonable body of doctors could 
have held.’ 132 
 
The concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness has its origins in administrative law. 133 In 
keeping with Teff,134 the Wednesbury threshold is not an apposite test for a clinical negligence 
claim, but it may be part of the solution to the difficulties with the current test of gross 
negligence. 
 
Wednesbury – when no-one would have acted as the defendant did 
One of the grounds for an application for judicial review is that the decision made by a public 
authority was irrational. In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corporation135 a decision was labelled irrational if, ‘[i]t is so unreasonable that it might almost 
 
131 Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med LR 393 at 397 
132Bolitho v City of Hackney HA [1993] 4 Med LR 381, at 392  
133 Associated Provincial v Wednesbury, above n.106 
134 Harvey Teff, ‘The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence – Moving on from Bolam’, (1998) 18 Oxford J Legal Stud 473 
at 480. 
135  Associated Provincial v Wednesbury , above n. 106 
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be described as being done in bad faith;’ and that to prove a decision as irrational ‘would require 
something overwhelming’.136In such an instance, the court could legitimately interfere.  
 
The concept of bad faith is more often associated with claims in contract and commercial 
dealings, although medical law has also recognised its usefulness in assessing the integrity of 
a doctor’s decision.137A doctor who either intentionally or maliciously adopts a course of action 
resulting in the death of their patient has clearly acted in bad faith. Such a doctor is negligent, 
additionally culpable and therefore a criminal. Similarly, the doctor who knowingly disregards 
a risk and has embarked on a path that has no logical basis or explanation, or follows a course 
of action that ‘no sensible person who has applied his mind to the question to be decided could 
have arrived at it,’138; such a doctor’s actions are illogical, grossly unreasonable and potentially 
criminal.  
 
The Wednesbury test demands evidence that is overwhelming. Lord Diplock describes the court 
power to review a decision ‘which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral 
standards’ that it would be endorsed by no-one. 139 A criticism of the Wednesbury test, as 
applied in an administrative law context, is that the evidential threshold is impossibly high. 
However, given the consequences of labelling a doctor a criminal, the Wednesbury test in a 
revised gross negligence manslaughter test could be apposite. This further notch along the 
sliding scale, (Wednesbury) unreasonableness may appease those who would contend a test 
based on logic is insufficiently rigorous. 
 
The following paragraph re-runs a variation of the facts of Bolitho to demonstrate how this new 
test might work in a case of gross negligence manslaughter.  
 
(i) Bolitho adjusted 
 
136  Ibid. The court observed that ‘it may be still possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four 
corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever have come to it.’ 
137 S.1(1) Abortion Act 1967 provides a statutory defence to the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. S1(1) provides that a 
person shall not be guilty of an offence when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered practitioner if two medical practitioners 
are of the opinion, formed in good faith that one of the grounds uder s.1(1) are met. In R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376 a doctor 
was found not to have acted in good faith as he failed to make any enquiries into the woman’s circumstances. 
138 CCSU v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, at 410 
139 Ibid  
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Imagine the registrar (Dr Horn) attends Patrick Bolitho and is concerned that a third episode of 
life-threatening respiratory distress may occur imminently.140 Instead of preparing for such an 
eventuality by calling the consultant, arranging for an urgent intensive care review and 
preparing drugs and equipment for immediate intubation, she simply goes back to clinic. 
The doctor in this scenario is aware of the risks of grave danger but fails to make any attempt 
to avoid that risk, the risk is embraced, it is knowingly taken. The doctor’s actions are illogical 
– in this situation, there can only be one answer – an x therefore y deduction. This doctor is 
operating in a lacuna, the doctor has chosen to knowingly take a risk which poses grave danger 
to the patient.141 This is a violation, it is a deliberate choice to deviate from accepted practice.142 
A risk that can, and should, be easily avoided. The doctor has control over the situation, there 
are no extraneous factors preventing this doctor from electing to follow a different course of 
action. By returning to the clinic this doctor has reached a decision which is grossly 
unreasonable, a decision that no reasonable doctor would support ‘in all the circumstances.’143 
The doctor’s actions were so bad (substitute illogical or grossly unreasonable) as to justify the 
imposition of criminal liability. Our hypothetical doctor may be guilty of gross negligence 
manslaughter.  
 
Ashworth previously suggested that tests founded in negligence may be appropriate in 
establishing criminal liability where the harm is great, the risk of it occurring is obvious, and 
where the defendant has both the duty and the capacity to avoid the risk.144 This is true, however 
the doctor must be aware of the risk and have control over whether to make the obvious and 
logical choice to avoid that risk. In those circumstances, what might be deemed foolhardy, 
risky, dicey or whatever epithet favoured, is conduct that is not only illogical and unreasonable 
but may also be criminal. What those circumstances are is the focus of the next section, together 
with a further exploration of the illogical and unreasonableness test.  
 
Adomako and Bolitho revisited and introducing Barnett - the grossly illogical / 
unreasonable doctor in all the circumstances 
The previous sections  outlined the facts of Adomako and Bolitho. Barnett, however, is a new 
addition to the discussion. In Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management 
 
140 Bolitho, above n. 106 
141 Hucks, above n. 131, at page 1160 
142  Merry and Brookbanks, above n.6 at page 41 et seq 
143 Adomako, above n.10  
144 Ashworth, above n 33  pp 187-8 
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Committee,145 three night-watchmen presented at a hospital casualty department complaining 
that they had been vomiting for three hours after drinking tea. The nurse on duty reported their 
complaints by telephone to the duty medical casualty officer, who, without seeing the men, 
instructed the nurse to inform the men to go home to bed and see their own doctor.  Five hours 
later, the men were dead from arsenic poisoning, later sourced to their tea.  A widow of one of 
the men unsuccessfully claimed that the casualty officer was negligent for failing to attend her 
husband.146 Factually, Barnett and Bolitho are similar in that both doctors were negligent for 
failing to attend their respective patients. Similarly, Adomako negligently failed to monitor his 
patient. In all three cases it is contended that the defendants breach of duty was illogical, grossly 
unreasonable and potentially causative of the death of their patient. Barnett, Bolitho and 
Adomako will now be used to illustrate the blurring of civil and criminal liability and the 
feasibility of a sliding scale approach  to criminality. The framework proposed by Brazier and 
Alghrani proves helpful in this regard.147 
 
First, did the doctor owe a duty of care to the patient?  
As a starting point, a necessary element is establishing a duty of care. Dr Adomako owed such 
a duty, as did Dr Horn in Bolitho and the casualty officer in Barnett. 
  
Was the doctor in breach of that duty? Is there simple negligence? 
Yes, Adomako breached his duty of care, as did Dr Horn and the casualty officer in Barnett. 
All three doctors’ care fell below the Bolam standard, the first limb of the Brazier & Alghrani 
test.148 In all three cases, there is simple negligence and a civil action. 
 
Should the breach be categorised as gross negligence?  
Brazier and Alghrani categorise a doctor’s actions as gross if that doctor has showed an 
indifference to an obvious risk of serious injury to the patient.149 Substituting illogicality for 
indifference may produce a clearer outcome. Adomako was aware that the patient was 
paralysed and totally dependent on the ventilator but illogically failed to monitor whether the 
ventilator was connected to his patient.  Being aware of the risk, making a choice (in his case 
 
145Barnett, above n.112 
146 Which ultimately failed on causation. the evidence indicated that the poisoning was too far advanced for any intervention 
to have saved the claimant’s life. 
147 Brazier and Alghrani, above n.57 at page 65 
148 Ibid 
149 Ibid 
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to do nothing) and having control over the situation, Dr Adomako’s actions were both (Bolitho) 
illogical and (Wednesbury) unreasonable. It was a decision that ‘no sensible person… could 
have arrived at.’150 Similarly, the non-attendance by the casualty officer in Barnett 
demonstrates an indifference that was illogical. A doctor failing to attend a patient and wilfully 
ignoring symptoms is aware of the risk of serious injury and having a choice to act otherwise 
has failed in their duty to safeguard their patient. 151  
 
In Bolitho the failure of Dr. Horn, the Senior Paediatric Registrar, to attend Patrick Bolitho on 
not just one but on two occasions was negligent.  Being aware of Patrick’s medical history of 
a heart condition and croup, and that Patrick ‘was having difficulty in breathing and was very 
very white’, 152  Dr Horn chose not to attend. However, does this mean that any failure to attend 
a patient is negligent with the potential for criminal liability? In Bolitho, Dr Horn delegated 
this duty to Dr Rodgers. Disastrously, she too failed to appear, contending that she failed to 
receive any instruction. Although Dr Rodgers may have been negligent for failing to attend 
Patrick Bolitho, she was unaware of the impending crisis, she was unaware of the risks of non-
attendance, there was no choice made to disregard the risk, she was not in control of the 
situation and consequently Dr Rodgers cannot be criminally liable. Returning to the words of 
Lord Mackay in Adomako any non-attendance must be viewed in the context of ‘all the 
circumstances’, on the spectrum of inadvertence and only if the obligatory ingredient of 
culpability is evident will negligence stray into the domain of the criminal law.153 
 
The doctor who was aware and the doctor who should have been aware. Illogicality / 
Unreasonableness a catch all proviso? 
Brazier and Alghrani distinguish between the doctor who is aware of the risk and opts to 
disregard it and the doctor who is unaware but should have been aware if they had been 
complying with accepted practice. This is not always an exculpatory distinction. If the doctor 
is aware and elects to unnecessarily run that risk, then their actions are illogical and potentially 
 
150  CCSU v Minister for Civil Service, above n.138 
151 Brazier and A Alghrani, above n.57. As Brazier and Alghrani remark the doctor, being aware of a risk has ‘exposed the 
patient to that risk for no accepted medical benefit.’   
152 Bolitho, above n.106, at 1153 
153 Adomako, above n.10. Brazier and Alghrani refer to mitigating circumstances. Bolitho produced two incidences of 
negligence. The court were invited to speculate on what steps Dr Horn  would have then taken had she attended and whether 
it would have been negligent to run the risk of total respiratory collapse rather than intubate. Expert evidence was equivocal 
and consequently the court were obliged, as the Bolam test dictates, to find that she would not have been negligent for failing 
to intubate. For the reasons outlined earlier, with respect this is incorrect. Logic decrees that this was an episode of 
‘unreasonable risk-taking’.Whether this conduct was also blameworthy is decidedly more awkward. (above n.57) 
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Wednesbury unreasonable. Similarly, if the doctor is unaware but deliberately deviates from 
accepted practice, then their actions are also illogical. Conceivably, Adomako could have 
argued that he was unaware of the risk but the fact that he chose not to monitor the patient-
ventilator connection (contrary to standard practice) and then failed to recognise the 
disconnection, were choices that an anaesthetist following accepted practice and acting 
logically would have avoided.154  In Barnett the medical expert commenting on the duty of the 
casualty officer said, 
‘In my view, the duty of a casualty officer is in general to see and examine all patients who 
come to the casualty department of the hospital.’ … ‘When a nurse is told that three men have 
been vomiting having drunk tea and have abdominal pains her duty is to report it, and she 
should report accurately to the doctor. The first step she should take to deal with the matter is 
to take a history’ - and the doctor put it most emphatically in this way – ‘I cannot conceive that 
after a history of vomiting for three hours a doctor would leave the matter to a nurse, however 
experienced the nurse.’155 
Agreeing with these sentiments Nield J commented, ‘Without doubt the casualty officer should 
have seen and examined the deceased. His failure to do either cannot be described as an 
excusable error as has been submitted. It was negligence.’156 
 
The casualty doctor’s non-attendance was negligent, illogical and Wednesbury unreasonable. 
Ignorance should not be a defence for the blameworthy doctor unless such ignorance is both 
logical and defensible.157 
 
When two become one – simple, gross, and all the circumstances 
Accepting that all three of our defendants’ actions are illogical or grossly unreasonable the final 
issue to address is where on the ‘spectrum of negligence’ should such conduct attract criminal 
liability. Brazier and Alghrani contend negligence may be gross negligence unless there are 
mitigating circumstances. 158 In other words, the ‘all the circumstances’ caveat espoused by 
Lord Mackay in Adomako. 159 A test of illogicality or Wednesbury unreasonableness would 
 
154  Prentice, Adomako; Holloway, above n.17 
155  Barnett, above n.112, at 428 
156 Ibid  
157 See Laird, above n.39 
158 Brazier and A Alghrani, above n.57, at page 65 They give the example of a doctor working in ‘circumstances that 
substantially impaired his ability to provide adequate care for his patient’ or a doctor who is allegedly unaware of a risk, a 
doctor who ‘ lacked the experience or capacity to deliver the treatment in question.’ 
159 Adomako, above n.10 
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cater for a consideration of extraneous factors. The fact that Dr Adomako had failed to keep up 
to date with areas of his practice would not lessen a finding of gross negligence, this would not 
excuse but corroborate a finding of his illogical conduct, Adomako’s conduct was by all 
accounts bad and deserving of criminal retribution.160 Dr Horn in Bolitho and the non-attending 
casualty officer in Barnett also would have the opportunity to present an argument why their 
actions are not culpable given the circumstances they faced. A test of logic is to infer ‘if X then 
Y’ but if there is reason why Y is not the obvious solution then those reasons must and should 
be accepted. Adopting a test of illogicality or unreasonableness does not preclude a fair 
hearing.161  Competing demands on the defendant or even a failure of hospital equipment as 
was alleged in Bolitho may result in what appears to be an illogical course of action being 
pronounced sub-standard but not criminal.162 
 
A test of illogicality / Wednesbury unreasonableness removes the circularity of the present test 
for gross negligence manslaughter. A sliding scale from simple to illogical / Wednesbury 
unreasonable is a linear approach with clearer boundaries. Only when the illogical/ Wednesbury 
unreasonable marker is met, is culpability considered. The illogical test is an objective test 
focussed on an assessment of risks. The Wednesbury unreasonable test is even more clear-cut, 
the offender’s actions are endorsed by no-one. Applying such a test followed by an evaluation 
of the degree of blame would result in the acquittal of Prentice and Sullman and, probably, Dr 
Bawa-Garba but the conviction of Dr Adomako. 
 
 
160 In Rowley v DPP [2003] EWHC 693 (Admin) Lord Justice Kennedy analysing the four objective tests in Adomako said ‘It 
is clear from what Lord Mackay said that there is a fifth ingredient: “criminality” (albeit defining the ingredient in this way 
“involves an element of circularity”) or “badness”. Using the word “badness”, the jury must be sure that the defendant's conduct 
was so bad as in all the circumstances to amount “to a criminal act or omission”. Lord Hewart C.J. in Bateman used the words: 
“to amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving punishment”, that is, conduct which does not merely call for 
compensation but for criminal punishment. This fifth ingredient of ‘badness’ does not feature in subsequent cases (see for 
example R v Becker [2000] WL 877688.) 
161 This approach might be considered analogous to the civil law principle of invoking res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for 
itself). In the event of an accident which would not normally occur if proper care is taken and the defendant was in complete 
control of the event then the accident itself is evidence of negligence. The defendant will held liable unless they can provide  
an explanation for the illogicality of the act or omission, see Scott v London and St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596, 
[601] Erle CJ, Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343. Note to rebut the inference of negligence the defendant’s 
explanation must be plausible, see Saunders v Leeds Western HA (1993) 4 Med LR 355  
 
162 The circumstances that doctors Prentice and Sullman and Bawa-Garba encountered lead to a very different conclusion as 
to the logicality and culpability of their conduct. Dr Prentice was the equivalent of an FY1 doctor and had never 
administered the chemotherapy drugs or received the relevant training, Dr Sullman also had limited experience. Dr Bawa-
Garba was working her first and very long shift after her return from maternity leave, she had little support from the 
consultant or nurses and encountered computer failures. 
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The preceding paragraphs explored what conduct should warrant the imposition of criminal 
liability and advocated a new approach. Accepting that the criminal law has a role to play in 
the regulation of the medical profession is there a case for widening the scope of liability to 
include those actions causing harm falling short of death?  
 
Moral luck – Should the outcome matter more than the violation? 
Hubbeling concludes that ‘when assigning blame and considering criminal prosecution and 
professional disbarment, one has to look at the actual behaviour and not at the 
consequences.’163 He contends that ‘blame should only be attributed if the behaviour was 
unusual and would not have been acceptable even without the adverse outcome.’164 For 
Hubbeling, an adverse outcome leads to a duty to make amends but not blame.165 The case of 
Prentice and Sullman, referred to by Hubbeling is perhaps the best embodiment of the moral 
luck conundrum. A mistake resulting from systems failure led to the prosecution of two junior 
doctors. No blame was ascribed to the defendants, they were guilty of an error but not a 
violation but because the doctors’ error resulted in the death of a patient, this led to a criminal 
prosecution.166 Herein lies the problem, Drs Prentice and Sullman were unlucky, death resulted 
from an excusable error. How, therefore, should the law respond where there is a violation that 
causes severe harm but does not end in death? 
 
‘Medical negligence only becomes a crime if the patient dies.’167 This statement leads Griffiths 
and Saunders to, as they themselves acknowledge, surprisingly advocate an increase in scope 
of gross negligence manslaughter, to both recognise public concern and to ‘punish behaviour 
that in other contexts would be likely to be punished.’168 They argue for ‘a context-specific 
negligence-based offence for healthcare,’ which they contend would ‘offer a fairer and more 
nuanced approach to using criminal law.’ 169Academics such as Quick have shied away from 
this idea, contending that medical errors are more variable than, say, driving offences and 
 
163 D. Hubleing ‘Medical Error and Moral Luck’  Published online: 12 December 2015 Springer Science+Business Media 
Dordrecht 2015 HEC Forum (2016) 28:229–243 DOI 10.1007/s10730-015-9295-3, at 241 
164 Ibid  
165 ibid 
166 Given the leniency of sanction imposed by the General Medical Council it is apparent that their profession was 
uncomfortable with their conduct being classed as criminal purely on the basis that a patient died. 
167 Griffiths  and Sanders above n.83. ‘The road to the dock: prosecution decision-making in medical manslaughter cases’  
pages 117-158. See also M Brazier and A Alghrani  above n. 57 
168 Ibid at 157 
169 Ibid at 150  
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prosecutors would encounter difficulties in identifying the classification of the medical error.170 
It is true the present legal test is formulated in such a fashion that defining when negligence 
becomes criminal negligence is at best problematic, at its worst unfair. However, part of the 
problem, as Quick himself admits, is that the absence of a lesser crime means that gross 
negligence manslaughter is an ‘all or nothing scenario.’171 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 
2015, described below, may offer the broadening of scope suggested. 
 
If a doctor's conduct were to expose a callous indifference to his patient but that patient suffered 
harm short of death, the doctor would ordinarily escape criminal sanction. The harmed patient 
is required to provide a lower standard of proof than in a criminal court in order to be 
compensated for the harm he has suffered. The criminal court represents the Crown, not the 
victim. Hence, in the field of medicine, injuries sustained through negligence, which would 
ordinarily meet the threshold for grievous bodily harm,172 seldom result in the prosecution and 
conviction of the responsible doctor. 
 
The National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England was established to support 
the work of Robert Francis' review into the failures at Mid-Staffordshire Hospital.173 One of 
their conclusions was that there needed to be a process to deal with cases where the act or 
omission of a care worker constituted ill-treatment or wilful neglect. There already exists 
criminal offences to punish those who ill-treat or wilfully neglect children,174 adults who lack 
capacity175 or those subject to the Mental Health Act 1983, but until 2015 no offence to punish 
those who ill-treat or wilfully neglect adults with full mental capacity.176  
 
To give effect to the recommendations made by the Francis review, the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 contains the necessary legislation against ill-treatment and wilful neglect of 
adults with capacity.177 Hence, the ill treatment or wilful neglect of all persons is now covered, 
at least once, by statute. 
 
170 Quick, above n.8 “Medical Mistakes and Manslaughter: a criminal combination?’ 
171 Ibid 
172 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
173 Francis Review <www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-mid-staffordshire-nhs-foundation-trust-public-
inquiry> accessed 24 December 2019 
174 S1. Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
175 S44. Mental Capacity Act 2005 
176 Karl Laird 'Filling a Lacuna: The Care Worker and Care Provider Offences in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015' 
(2016) 37 Statute Law Review 1 
177 Ss. 20-25 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
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On the face of it, these provisions appear to increase the scope of criminal liability for doctors. 
The offences of wilful neglect and ill-treatment are in addition to the common-law offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter. Debate in the British Medical Journal sheds light on the 
disquiet this causes amongst doctors.178 However, the offences accord with the proposition that 
it is the conduct of the doctor, rooted in the traditional mens rea and actus rea limbs of 
criminality, which gives the 2015 Act its appeal. Additionally, part of the Act deals specifically 
with the employers of those guilty of wilful neglect or ill-treatment.179 The Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 need not be separately engaged.180 
 
Common to all of the statutes criminalising wilful neglect is the definition of ‘wilful’. This 
mens rea component requires a subjective awareness of the risk of harm.181 It is a crime of 
omission. The omission itself need not actually cause harm; in this sense, it is purely a conduct 
crime with no outcome required.182 However, from a practical perspective, it is hard to envisage 
how a doctor showing wilful neglect, which causes no harm, would fall under the gaze of a 
criminal court. The General Medical Council are much more likely to be notified of harmless 
wilful neglect (and act on it) than the police.183 This would result in professional sanction. 
 
Ill-treatment is easy to spot but more difficult to define. In Heaney, a nurse slapped one patient 
and put copious amounts of vinegar and sugar in another's tea.184 Neither victim appeared 
distressed by the abuse, but the defendant was nevertheless given a custodial sentence. Again, 
it was the conduct which attracted criminal attention, not the outcome. 
 
 
178 Palavi Bradshaw 'Criminal offence of wilful neglect may undermine, rather than improve, patient safety' (2015) British 
Medical Journal <www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h1722>; Jo Bibby Christine Tomkins 'Would criminalising healthcare 
professionals for wilful neglect improve patient care?' (2014) British Medical Journal <www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g133> 
 
179 S.21 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
180 The Health and Social Care Act 2015 specifies punishment for neglect; a conduct offence. The Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 requires an outcome of death before being invoked. The 2015 Act alone could, conceivably, 
be invoked if neglect has resulted in death. 
181 Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 2020 Ed. Chapter 17 - The Mental Element in Crime Part II. Specific 
Requirements as to State of Mind Section F. Wilfulness 17-44; R v Shepphard [1981] AC 394 HL; R v G [2003] UKHL 50, 
[2004] AC 1034; Turbill and Broadway [2013] EWCA Crim 1422, [2014] 1 Cr App R 7; AG Ref (No 3 of 2003) [2004] 
EWCA crim 868, [2004] 2 Cr App R 23 
182  R v Patel [2013] EWCA Crim 965, 2013 WL 2628767 [24] 
183 General Medical Council 'Good Medical Practice' devotes several sections to 'maintaining trust' and 'acting with honesty 
and integrity'; standards which must be demonstrated in formal annual appraisals, breaches of which must be reported to the 
GMC.  
184 R v Heaney [2011] EWCA Crim 2682, [2011] 11 WLUK 155 
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Both charges of wilful neglect and ill-treatment are capable of deterring bad behaviours which 
may lead to harm. If properly employed, along with the organisational sanctions included in 
the 2015 Act (in addition to existing Health and Safety law), violations can be deterred. 
Unfortunately, the Act is unlikely to make any impact on inadvertent errors, even those 
resulting in death. There still remains the problem of managing non-wilful neglect and 
unintended ill-treatment which cause death. The only criminal sanction is that of gross 
negligence which, as already argued, is not a suitable vehicle for deterrence or improving 
standards.  
 
Sentencing – the final bastion 
Thus far, it has been argued that there needs to be a reformulation of the legal test of gross 
negligence manslaughter. Recent changes to the process of bringing a prosecution case, whilst 
welcome, do not address the faulty essence of the offence.185 Vaughan et al, however, believe 
the recent sentencing guidelines for manslaughter show a constructive approach at the end of 
the legal process. 186 Evidently, once the court is at the stage of sentencing, there is no going 
back; the doctor has been labelled a criminal with all the ensuing consequences.  As Chalmers 
and Leverick note, a sentence may not reflect the degree of culpability as the sentence may be 
aggravated or mitigated because of unrelated factors to the offence.187 However, the new 
sentencing guidelines do bring some shade and depth into what conduct is deserving of the 
harshest sanction. 188 
 
The Guidelines 
The guidelines came into force on 1 November 2018 and apply retrospectively.  As Fidderman 
notes, this is the first occasion that the council has issued a detailed guideline for manslaughter 
committed by an individual.189  
 
To begin, the Council has included a general statement in relation to  culpability, ‘[t]he court 
should avoid an overly mechanistic application of these factors.’190 
 
185 Gross negligence manslaughter in healthcare. The Report of a rapid policy review June 2018 (‘the Williams Review’) at 
para 3.1.  Independent review of gross negligence manslaughter and culpable homicide June 2019 (‘the Hamilton Review’). 
186 J Vaughan RCS Bulletin Vol 100 Issue 6 Sept 2018 pp 251-254 
187 J Chalmers and F Leverick “Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ 71 Med L Rev 217 , at 218. See also above n. 30 and 50. 
188 Manslaughter Definitive Guideline, <www.sentencing.council.org.uk> accessed 15th June 2020 
189  Fidderman Health and Safety Bulletin 472 HSB 6 1 OCTOBER 2018 A new sentencing guideline for gross negligence 
manslaughter 
190 Sentencing Guidelines, above n.188,page 10 
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Sensibly, this caveat echoes the Lord Mackay approach espoused in Adomako of reflecting on 
‘all the circumstances’ of the offence.191  The overall intent of the guidelines to embrace 
flexibility is to be welcomed. 
The penalty range runs from 1 year to 18 years and as Wasik observes ‘reflect the wide, factual 
circumstances and range of culpability which can apply in an offence based on a breach of a 
standard of care rather than on traditional mens rea.’192  There are four categories of culpability 
and one level of harm. At the most serious end of the spectrum ‘the offender showed a blatant 
disregard for a very high risk of death resulting from the negligent conduct.193’ This spectrum  
embraces factors indicating a lower level of culpability which include the offender’s actions 
identified as a ‘lapse’ in ‘otherwise satisfactory standard of care’ and the offender being in a 
‘lesser or subordinate role if acting with others in the offending.’194 The increased flexibility in 
approach to sentencing is further illustrated by the addition of new factors reducing the 
seriousness of the offence or alternatively being considered as mitigating circumstances. 
Although not healthcare-specific the inclusion of new factors, are a direct consequence of 
meetings between the Council and medical professionals. Factors ’beyond the offender’s 
control’ may be pleaded in mitigation. These include: 
  
‘(i) the offender lacked the necessary expertise, equipment, support or training which 
contributed to the negligent conduct;  
(ii) the offender was subject to stress or pressure (including from competing or complex 
demands) which related to and contributed to the negligent conduct; 
(iii) the negligent conduct occurred in circumstances where there was reduced scope for 
exercising usual care and competence; and 
(iv) the negligent conduct was compounded by the actions or omissions of others.’195 
  
Plainly, the courts are keen to move away from the punitive approach adopted in R v Garg 196  
and eager to utilise a greater variation in sentencing.  
 
 
191  Adomako, above n.10 
192 Martin Wasik ‘Reflections on the manslaughter sentencing guidelines’ Crim LR 2019, 4, 315-332 
193 Sentencing, above n. 188 page 10 
194 Ibid  
195 Ibid at page 13 
196 R v Garg (Sudhanshu) [2012] EWCA Crim 2520 
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Solution or stop-gap? Sentencing, gross negligence manslaughter and the sliding scale 
The guidelines seem to have gone some way to addressing the criticisms of Quirk who argued 
that the sentencing framework should reflect the ‘spectrum of culpability and the particular 
circumstances in which doctors’ work.’197 The approach taken in the revised sentencing 
guidelines effectively mirrors the ‘sliding scale’ of negligence; it acknowledges, expressly, that 
the defendant’s culpability is heavily influenced by all the circumstances surrounding the 
offence. Implicitly, the guidelines revisit mens rea as a necessary ingredient for the offence. 
Judge LJ previously stated that the grossness of the negligence provides the necessary mens 
rea for the offence and in Attorney General Ref (No 2) the court stated that the defendant’s 
state of mind need not be a consideration.198 The sentencing council have, perhaps, tacitly 
disregarded this approach. The most serious level of culpability echoes the proposed spectrum 
of negligence this would catch the doctor who carried on regardless, the clinician who ignored 
the red flag irrespective of the consequence, had no excuse and displayed a high level of 
culpability. This is recklessness, which has never been doubted as a highly culpable state of 
mind. The detailed examination of culpability in the sentencing guidelines ought, however, to 
also be evident at the prosecution stage.  
 
The addition of new mitigating factors also partially addresses the criticisms made by Dyer in 
relation to R v Sullman and Prentice who observed, 
‘Bringing the full weight of the criminal law to bear on two fledgling doctors will do 
little to remedy a system which lets juniors loose on patients with too little training, too 
little support, and too little sleep.’ 199 
 
Recognition in the guidelines that clinicians work often in highly-stressed and under resourced 
environments is long overdue and a necessary and timely intervention. Yet the addition of these 
new mitigating factors is necessary only as a result of the failure of the present legal test to 
acknowledge ‘all the circumstances’ of the crime. Patently, if the legal test is reformed in the 
guise of the spectrum of negligence, the overworked, understaffed, ill-trained clinician would 
be unlikely to fall within the remit of the criminal law because of the absence of the apposite 
level of culpability. However, acknowledging that a reformed legal test is some way off, in the 
 
197 Hannah Quirk ‘Sentencing white coat crime: the need for guidance in medical manslaughter cases’ Crim LR 2013, 11 871-
888 at page 881 
198 Attorney General reference, above n.48; Misra, above n. 28 
199 C Dyer ‘Manslaughter Convictions for Making Mistakes’ (1991) 303 BMJ 1218. Likewise, Dr Hadiza Bawa-Garba may 
have invoked not one but all of the mitigating factors above in her defence.  
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interim the guidelines have taken a positive step and have coherently mapped out the scale of 
culpability.200 
 
It is disappointing, however, that the guidelines apply only to ‘harm of the utmost seriousness’ 
defined as the loss of life.201 It is long overdue  that the moral-luck loophole is firmly closed, 
and the degree of negligence and blame should be the decisive factors in determining the level 
of criminality. The importance of the consequences of the clinician's conduct are undiminished 
by accepting that the degree of blame is of greater significance to the level of criminality. Quirk 
commented on the previous sentencing regime, ‘the court has focused too much on the harm 
rather than the culpability.’202 The new guidelines have partially redressed that inequality but 
to achieve a full equilibrium conduct resulting in serious harm should be accommodated. 
  
Conclusions: criminal or negligent – what now for the ‘bad’ doctor? 
There are many consequences from criminalising a negligent doctor. A negligent doctor may 
face professional disciplinary proceedings, limits imposed on their ability to practice, a 
cessation of any hope of professional advancement and crucially a professional reputation 
that is irreparably tarnished. Classifying negligent conduct as criminal, however, threatens a 
doctor with a personal reputation that is irreparably tarnished.  The possibility of 
imprisonment will convey ‘the impression that his conduct was graver than it was,’ and ‘the 
public may tend to shun the defendant on inadequate grounds, he may find it more difficult to 
find employment as a result.’ 203  Doctors do not like going to court; Coroner’s, High Court 
or Crown but as Brazier asserts ’a civil claim does not mean professional ruin or personal 
disgrace.’204 
 
 
 
200 The Council have stated that the aim is to achieve greater consistency in manslaughter sentencing although it does not 
expect sentence levels to change. The guideline allows for a suspended sentence of 1 year all the way to 18 years of custody. 
Few other offences exhibit such a range of punishment with a single act: causing the death of another human being. This may 
suggest that gross negligence manslaughter covers such a broad range of circumstances with just a single end-point (death) 
and may not be used against both the wantonly reckless and the unlucky incompetent. 
201 Sentencing, above n. 188 
202 Quirk, above n.197  at 888 
203 V Tadros, Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity in Principles and Values in Criminal Law: essay in Honour of Andrew 
Ashworth, ed Lucia Zedner and Julian Roberts, OUP 2012 1st ed pp67-80, at 71 
Page 67-80 at page 71 
204 Brazier & Alghrani, above n.57, at 55 
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There may be ‘nothing so concrete as a formula for defining what conduct should be 
criminalised’ but given that the stakes could not be higher whatever label the law applies to an 
offence ought fairly to represent the offender’s wrong-doing.205 The present regime leaves little 
room for evaluation of the doctor’s actions. Lord Mackay in Adomako pointedly made 
reference to the need for a consideration of ‘all the circumstances’ and yet such has been the 
pre-occupation with when simple negligence becomes gross, an assessment of whether the 
doctor is wholly culpable has not been given the necessary attention it demands and deserves.206  
 
It is argued that the present test is broken, it lacks certainty and fails to identify what degree of 
fault is required for criminal censure.  An alternative test is required. The “major departure” 
test avoids the need to determine the ‘grossness’ of the negligence with a focus on accepted 
practice but arguably this too suffers from a lack of clarity. Given the very few criminal 
prosecutions in New Zealand and the shift of focus to improving patient safety, the test 
conceivably has a very limited role in the regulation of doctors. There is much to commend the 
Scottish regime, which puts culpability centre stage and additionally requires any prosecution 
to be in the public interest.207  However, the Scots use the high bar of recklessness as the starting 
point for culpability. For too long the English courts have determined guilt or innocence solely 
on the basis of proof that the conduct in question fell below an objectively set standard without 
a satisfactory analysis of the subjective mens rea elements of the offence. 
 
The sliding scale of negligence may be considered too formulaic but accepting that both 
criminal and civil liability share a common purpose to regulate substandard care it is suggested 
this test can assess how bad the negligence is, to differentiate the simple from gross. Terms 
such as ‘illogical’ and ‘a decision that would be endorsed by no-one’ are expressions that 
provide the jury with some form of benchmark rather than be reliant on their own individual 
perception of what they perceive as gross negligence. Mindful that for any criminal sanction, 
there must have been the ability or the unexercised capacity to have done things differently, 
reaching the end point of the sliding scale of negligence must then trigger an assessment of 
blame. Criminality requires culpability. If the doctor’s actions are lacking in logic or would be 
 
205Ashworth , above n.88 
206 Adomako, above n. 10. This will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant in all the 
circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred.  
 
207 Public interest is the focus of another article in this volume but culpability is pivotal if the doctor’s conduct has reached 
the end point of the sliding scale. 
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endorsed by no-one and the blame lies solely at the feet of this doctor then this is a negligent 
and criminal doctor. The new sentencing guidelines are to be welcomed for clearly delineating 
the scale of culpability but by this stage the damage is done, the doctor is branded a criminal. 
The nuanced approach in sentencing must be reflected in the test itself, for once in the dock the 
horse has long since bolted. 
Consideration should be also be given to broadening the offence to include instances of severe 
harm caused by gross negligence. Alternatively, greater use of the conduct-based criminal 
offences of wilful neglect and ill-treatment should be made to capture culpable gross 
negligence which causes harm short of death; luck should not be the determining factor in 
relation to criminality.  Culpable conduct causing irreparable harm is no less reprehensible than 
a conscious disregard resulting in a fatality and a system where it is ‘the chance of death alone 
that transforms negligence from a civil to a criminal matter is illogical, regardless of whom the 
defendant might be.’208 
 
As a final thought, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic raises more questions about the current 
legal test for gross negligence manslaughter. With intensive care resources stretched by 
demand, doctors are faced with deciding which patients should be given invasive ventilation. 
Two issues arise: the 'Bolam standard of care' and 'all the circumstances'.  In a negligence claim, 
determining whether a doctor’s actions have fallen below the Bolam standard will be 
effectively decided by expert witnesses who may never have been directly involved in the 
pandemic. These same experts will be tasked with examining if the breach of duty is so serious 
as to be considered criminal. Whether the present circumstances are deemed exculpatory will 
inevitably depend on the personal experiences of the jurors, many of whom will have known 
people who have died from the virus. This makes for a very uncertain outcome. It is hoped that 
the Crown Prosecution Service, with its public interest test, will demand obvious 'badness' 
before hauling mentally and physically exhausted intensive care staff into the criminal court. 
Culpability is key, for once in court their fate is entirely unpredictable.209 
 
 
 
 
208 Brazier & Alghrani, above n.57, page 66 
209 In the words of Freckleton above n..34, ‘We must be realistic and not aspire unreasonably to 
perfection in clinical practice, especially in such working conditions’. See further Jon Maskill and Michelle Robson “Covid-
19-legal issues-a response to the BMA’ <www.researchgate.net/publication/340563156> accessed 15th June 2020.  
